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Abstract—Physical security of power networks under power
injection attacks that alter generation and loads is studied. The
system operator employs Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
for detecting such attacks, while attackers devise attacks that
are unobservable by such PMU networks. It is shown that,
given the PMU locations, the solution to finding the sparsest
unobservable attacks has a simple form with probability one,
namely, κ(GM) + 1, where κ(GM) is defined as the vulnerable
vertex connectivity of an augmented graph. The constructive
proof allows one to find the entire set of the sparsest unobservable
attacks in polynomial time. Furthermore, a notion of the potential
impact of unobservable attacks is introduced. With optimized
PMU deployment, the sparsest unobservable attacks and their
potential impact as functions of the number of PMUs are
evaluated numerically for the IEEE 30, 57, 118 and 300-bus
systems and the Polish 2383, 2737 and 3012-bus systems. It is
observed that, as more PMUs are added, the maximum potential
impact among all the sparsest unobservable attacks drops quickly
until it reaches the minimum sparsity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern power networks are increasingly dependent on
information technology in order to achieve higher efficiency,
flexibility and adaptability [1]. The development of more
advanced sensing, communications and control capabilities
for power grids enables better situational awareness and
smarter control. However, security issues also arise as more
complex information systems become prominent targets of
cyber-physical attacks: not only can there be data attacks on
measurements that disrupt situation awareness [2], but also
control signals of power grid components including generation
and loads can be hijacked, leading to immediate physical
misbehavior of power systems [3]. Furthermore, in addition
to hacking control messages, a powerful attacker can also
implement physical attacks by directly intruding upon power
grid components. Therefore, to achieve reliable and secure
operation of a smart power grid, it is essential for the system
operator to minimize (if not eliminate) the feasibility and
impact of physical attacks.
There are many closely related techniques that can help
achieve secure power systems. Firstly, coding and encryption
can better secure control messages and communication links
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[4], and hence raise the level of difficulty of cyber attacks.
To prevent physical attacks, grid hardening is another design
choice [5]. However, grid hardening can be very costly, and
hence may only apply to a small fraction of the components in
large power systems. Secondly, power systems are subject to
many kinds of faults and outages [6], [7], [8], which are in a
sense unintentional physical attacks. As such outages are not
inflicted by attackers, they are typically modeled as random
events, and detecting outages is often modeled as a hypothesis
testing problem [9]. However, this event and detection model
is not necessarily accurate for intentional physical attacks,
which are the focus of this paper. Indeed, an intelligent attacker
would often like to strategically optimize its attack, such that
it is not only hard to detect, but also the most viable to
implement (e.g., with low execution complexity as well as
high impact).
Recently, there has been considerable research concerning
data injection attacks on sensor measurements from super-
visory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. A
common and important goal among these works is to pursue
the integrity of network state estimation, that is, to successfully
detect the injected data attack and recover the correct system
states. The feasibility of constructing data injection attacks to
pass bad data detection schemes and alter estimated system
states was first shown in [2]. There, a natural question arises
as to how to find the sparsest unobservable data injection
attack, as sparsity is used to model the complexity of an
attack, as well as the resources needed for an attacker to
implement it. However, finding such an optimal attack requires
solving an NP-hard l0 minimization problem. While efficiently
finding the sparsest unobservable attacks in general remains
an open problem, interesting and exact solutions under some
special problem settings have been developed in [10] [11] [12].
Another important aspect of a data injection attack is its impact
on the power system. As state estimates are used to guide
system and market operation of the grid, several interesting
studies have investigated the impact of data attacks on opti-
mal power flow recommendation [13] and location marginal
prices in a deregulated power market [14] [15]. Furthermore,
as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) become increasingly
deployed in power systems, network situational awareness for
grid operators is significantly improved compared to using
legacy SCADA systems only. However, while PMUs provide
accurate and secure sampling of the system states, their high
installation costs prohibit ubiquitous deployment. Thus, the
problem of how to economically deploy PMUs such that the
state estimator can best detect data injection attacks is an
interesting problem that many studies have addressed (see, e.g.
[16], [17], [18] among others.)
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2Compared to data attacks that target state estimators, phys-
ical attacks that directly disrupt power network physical pro-
cesses can have a much faster impact on power grids. In
addition to physical attacks by hacking control signals or
directly intruding upon grid components, several types of load
altering attacks have been shown to be practically imple-
mentable via Internet-based message attacks [3]. Topological
attacks are another type of physical attack which have been
considered in [19]. Dynamic power injection attacks have
also been analyzed in several studies. For example, in [20],
conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable
attacks were provided, and the sizes of the sets of such attacks
were shown to be bounded by graph-theoretic quantities.
Alternatively, in [21] and [22], state estimation is considered in
the presence of both power injection attacks and data attacks.
Specifically, in these works, the maximum number of attacked
nodes that still results in correct estimation was characterized,
and effective heuristics for state recovery under sparse attacks
were provided.
In this paper, we investigate a specific type of physical
attack in power systems called power injection attacks, that
alter generation and loads in the network. A linearized power
network model - the DC power flow model - is employed
for simplifying the analysis of the problem and obtaining a
simple solution that yields considerable insight. We consider
a grid operator that employs PMUs to (partially) monitor the
network for detecting power injection attacks. Since power
injection attacks disrupt the power system states immediately,
the timeliness of PMU measurement feedback is essential.
Furthermore, our model allows for the power injections at
some buses to be “unalterable”. This captures the cases of
“zero injection buses” with no generation and load, and buses
that are protected by the system operator. Under this model
we study the open l0 minimization problem of finding the
sparsest unobservable attacks given any set of PMU locations.
We start with a feasibility problem for unobservable attacks.
We prove that the existence of an unobservable power injection
attack restricted to any given set of buses can be determined
with probability one by computing a quantity called the
structural rank. Next, we prove that the NP-hard problem of
finding the sparsest unobservable attacks has a simple solution
with probability one. Specifically, the sparsity of the optimal
solution is κ(GM)+1, where κ(GM) is the “vulnerable vertex
connectivity” that we define for an augmented graph of the
original power network. Meanwhile, the entire set of globally
optimal solutions (there can be many of them) is found in
polynomial time. We further introduce a notion of potential
impacts of unobservable attacks. Accordingly, among all the
sparsest unobservable attacks, an attacker can easily find the
one with the greatest potential impact. Finally, given optimized
PMU placement, we evaluate the sparsest unobservable attacks
in terms of their sparsity and potential impact in the IEEE 30,
57, 118 and 300-bus, and the Polish 2383, 2737 and 3012-bus
systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, models of the power network, power injection
attacks, PMUs and unalterable buses are established. In addi-
tion, the minimum sparsity problem of unobservable attacks is
formulated. In Section III we provide the feasibility condition
for unobservable attacks restricted to any subset of the buses.
In Section IV we prove that the minimum sparsity of unobserv-
able attacks can be found in polynomial time with probability
one. In Section V, a PMU placement algorithm for countering
power injection attacks is developed, and numerical evaluation
of the sparsest unobservable attacks in IEEE benchmark test
cases and large-scale Polish power systems are provided.
Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Power network model
We consider a power network with N buses, and denote
the set of buses and the set of transmission lines by N =
{1, 2, . . . , N} and L = {1, 2, . . . , L} respectively. For a line
l ∈ L that connects buses n and m, denote its reactance by xl
as well as xnm, and define its incidence vector ml as follows:
ml(i) =
 1, if i = n,−1, if i = m,
0, otherwise.
Based on the power network topology and line reactances, we
construct a weighted graph G = {N ,L,w} where the edge
weight wl , 1xl ,∀l = 1, . . . , L. The power system is generally
modeled by nonlinear AC power flow equations [23]. In this
paper, a linearized model - the DC power flow model - is
employed as an approximation of the AC model, which allows
us to find a simple closed-form solution to the problem from
which we glean significant insights. Under the DC model, the
real power injections P ∈ RN and the voltage phase angles
θ ∈ RN satisfy P = Bθ, where B = ∑Ll=1 1xlmlmTl ∈
RN×N is the Laplacian of the weighted graph G. We assume
that xl is positive which is typically true for transmission lines
(cf. Chapter 4 of [23]). Furthermore, the power flow on line l
from bus n to bus m equals Pnm = 1xnm (θn − θm).
We consider attackers inflicting power injection attacks that
alter the generation and loads in the power network. We denote
the power injections in normal conditions by P , and denote
a power injection attack by ∆P ∈ RN . Thus the post-attack
power injections are P + ∆P .
B. Sensor model and unobservable attacks
We consider the use of PMUs by the system operator for
monitoring the power network in order to detect power injec-
tion attacks. With PMUs installed at the buses, we consider
the following two different sensor models:
1) A PMU securely measures the voltage phasor of the bus
at which it is installed.1
2) A PMU securely measures the voltage phasor of the bus
at which it is installed, as well as the current phasors on
all the lines connected to this bus2.
1The voltage phase angles at all the buses are defined to be relative to
a common reference — the phase angle at the angle reference bus in the
network.
2In practice, the second PMU measurement model is achieved by installing
PMUs on all the lines connected to a bus.
3We denote the set of buses with PMUs by M (⊆ N ), and let
M , |M| be the total number of PMUs, where | · | denotes
the cardinality of a set. Without loss of generality (WLOG),
we choose one of the buses in M to be the angle reference
bus. We say that a power injection attack ∆P is unobservable
if it leads to zero changes in all the quantities measured by the
PMUs. With the first PMU model described above, we have
the following definition:
Definition 1 (Unobservability condition). An attack ∆P 6= 0
is unobservable if and only if
∃∆θ, such that ∆P = B∆θ and ∆θM = 0, (1)
where ∆θM denotes the M × 1 sub-vector of ∆θ obtained
by keeping its M entries whose indices are in M.3
With the second PMU model described above, for any bus
n ∈ N , it is immediate to verify that the following three
conditions are equivalent:
1) There are no changes of the voltage phasor at n and of
the current phasors on all the lines connected to n.
2) There are no changes of the voltage phasor at n and of
the power flows on all the lines connected to n.
3) ∀n′ ∈ N [n], there is no change of the voltage phasor at
n′, where N [n] is the closed neighborhood of n which
includes n and its neighboring buses N(n).
Thus, for forming unobservable attacks, the following two
situations are equivalent to the attacker:
• The system operator monitors the set of buses M with
the second PMU model;
• The system operator monitors the set of buses N [M] with
the first PMU model,
where N [M] is the closed neighborhood ofM which includes
all the buses inM and their neighboring buses N(M). Thus,
the unobservability condition with the second PMU model
is obtained by replacing M with N [M] in (1). WLOG, we
employ the first PMU model in the following analysis, and
based on the discussion above all the results can be directly
translated to the second PMU model.
C. Sparsest unobservable attacks
In forming an unobservable attack, an attacker generally has
two objectives: minimize execution complexity and maximize
its impact on the grid. Note that these two objectives can be
competing interests that are not simultaneously achievable. We
will first focus on finding the minimum execution complexity
for an attack to be unobservable, which constitutes the main
part of this work. Among attacks with the minimum complex-
ity, we then find the one with the maximum impact.
For an attack vector ∆P , we use its zero norm ‖∆P ‖0 to
model its execution complexity. This is because attackers are
typically resource-constrained, and can choose only a limited
number of buses to implement attacks. For minimizing attack
complexity, an attacker is interested in finding the sparsest
3Since B is a weighted Laplacian matrix, the elements of ∆P sum to 0.
attacks that satisfy the unobservability condition (1):
min
∆θ
‖∆P ‖0 (2)
s.t. ∆P = B∆θ, ∆θM = 0, ∆θ 6= 0.
Since ∆θM = 0, ∆θ 6= 0 ⇒ B∆θ =
BNMc∆θMc ,∆θMc 6= 0, a more compact form of (2) is
as follows:
(2) ⇔ min
∆θMc 6=0
‖BNMc∆θMc‖0, (3)
where Mc = N\M denotes the complement of M , and
BNMc is the submatrix of B formed by choosing all its rows
and a set of columns Mc.
We now note that problem (3) is NP-hard: Specifically, as a
special case of the cospark problem of a matrix [24] problem
(3) resembles a security index problem discussed in [12],
which has been proven to be NP-hard. Under some special
problem settings for data injection attacks, problems of this
type have been shown to be solvable exactly in polynomial
time [10] [11] [12]. In general, low complexity heuristics have
been developed for solving l0 minimization problems (e.g., l1
relaxation).
We now generalize our model to allow a subset of buses
to be “unalterable buses”, meaning that their nodal power
injection cannot be changed by attackers. This allows us to
model the following scenarios:
• A “zero injection” bus that simply connects multiple lines
without nodal generation or load, and hence its power
injection is always zero and cannot be changed.
• A “protected” bus by the system operator, and its power
injection is not accessible by the attacker.
We denote the set of unalterable buses by U . The other buses
Uc are termed “alterable” buses. Generalizing (2), the sparsest
unobservable attack problem is established as follows:
min
∆θ
‖∆P ‖0 (4)
s.t. ∆P = B∆θ, ∆θM = 0, ∆PU = 0, ∆θ 6= 0.
When U = ∅, (4) reduces to (2). Generalizing (3), Eq. (4) has
the following equivalent form:
(4) ⇔ min
∆θMc 6=0,
(BNMc∆θMc )U=0
‖BNMc∆θMc‖0. (5)
D. Graph augmentation
Given the locations of the sensors M, we now introduce a
variation of the graph G that will prove key to developing the
main results later.
Definition 2. Given a set of buses M ⊆ N , GM is defined
to be the following augmented graph based on G:
1) GM includes all the buses in G, and has one additional
unalterable dummy bus.
2) Define an augmented set M¯ that contains M and the
unalterable dummy bus.
3) GM includes all the edges of G, and an edge is added
between every pair of buses in M¯, and its weight can
be chosen arbitrarily as any positive number.
4We note that the dummy bus is only connected to the set
of sensors M. We observe the following key facts. First,
an unobservable attack in the original graph G leads to zero
changes in all the voltage phase angles in M. Thus, any line
between a pair of buses inM would see a zero change of the
power flow on it. It is then clear that the added dummy bus
and lines in GM do not lead to any power flow changes in
the network under any unobservable attack. We thus have the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. An attack is unobservable by M in G if and only
if it is unobservable by M in GM.
This allows us to work with the augmented graph GM
instead of G. It is clear that the weights of the added edges in
GM do not matter for Lemma 1 to hold.
III. FEASIBILITY CONDITION OF UNOBSERVABLE ATTACKS
In this section, we address the following question whose
solutions will be useful in solving the minimum sparsity
problem (5): Assuming that the attacker can only alter the
power injections at a subset of the buses, denoted by A ⊆ Uc,
does there exist an attack that is unobservable by a set of PMUs
M? For any given A, a feasible non-zero attack ∆P ( 6= 0)
must satisfy ∆PAc = 0. In other words, it must not alter the
power injections at the buses in Ac.
From (1), there exists an unobservable non-zero attack if
and only if
∃∆P ,∆θ 6= 0, s.t.
∆P = B∆θ, ∆PAc = 0, ∆θM = 0. (6)
Since
{
∆θM = 0
∆θ 6= 0 ⇒ ∆θMc 6= 0,∆P 6= 0, we have that
(6) is equivalent to
∃∆θMc 6= 0, s.t. (∆PAc =) BAcMc∆θMc = 0, (7)
where BAcMc is the submatrix of B formed by its rows
Ac and columns Mc. An illustration of (7) is depicted in
Figure 1, where the submatrix formed by the shaded blocks
represents BAcMc . From (7), we have the following lemma
on the feasibility condition of unobservable attacks.
Lemma 2. Given A andM, there exists an unobservable non-
zero attack if and only if BAcMc is column rank deficient.
To analyze when this column rank deficiency condition,
rank (BAcMc) < |Mc|, is satisfied, we start with the fol-
lowing observations based on the fact that B is the Laplacian
of the weighted graph G.
1) The signs (+1, −1, or 0) of the entries of B are fully
determined by the network topology:
Bij > 0, if i = j,
Bij < 0, if node (bus) i and node j (i 6= j)
are connected by an edge (transmission line),
Bij = 0, if node (bus) i and node j (i 6= j) are
not connected.
c
0
0
0
0
P
0 0 0 0 0
Tθ
B
Fig. 1. An illustration of (7) where the submatrix formed by the shaded
blocks represents BAcMc .
2) The values of the non-zero entries of B are determined
by the line reactances {xij}:
Bii =
∑
j 6=i
wij =
∑
j 6=i
1
xij
,
Bij = −wij = − 1
xij
, if i 6= j and Bij 6= 0.
When all the line reactances in the power network are known,
so are the entries of the submatrixBAcMc , and it is immediate
to compute whether rank (BAcMc) < |Mc|. Without knowing
the exact values of any line reactances, we will show that
whether rank (BAcMc) < |Mc| can be determined almost
surely by computing the structural rank of BAcMc , defined
as follows [25].
Definition 3 (Set of independent entries). A set of independent
entries of a matrix H is a set of nonzero entries, no two of
which lie on the same line (row or column).
Definition 4 (Structural rank). The structural rank of a
matrix H , denoted by sprank(H), is the maximum number of
elements contained in at least one set of independent entries.
A basic relation between the structural rank and the rank of
a matrix is the following [25],
sprank(BAcMc) ≥ rank(BAcMc). (8)
In the literature, structural rank is also termed “generic rank”
[26].
Specifically, we consider generic power grid parameters,
i.e., we assume that the line reactances xl (l = 1, 2, . . . , L)
are independent, but not necessarily identical random variables
drawn from continuous probability distributions. We assume
that the reactances are bounded away from zero from below
(as lines do not have zero reactances in practice). As such, the
analysis in this work is along the line of structural properties
as in [25] and [26], and we will develop results that hold with
probability one. We believe the independence (but not identi-
cally distributed) assumption is sufficiently general in practice.
In particular, there are uncertainties in factors that influence
the reactance of a line (e.g. the distance that a line travels,
the degradation of a line over time). These uncertainties can
5be modeled as independent (but not identically distributed)
random variables, leading to the model employed in this paper.
Clearly, BAcMc is always column rank deficient when
|Ac| < |Mc|. Next, we discuss the case of |Ac| ≥ |Mc|.
We begin with the special case A = M, for which we have
the following lemma whose proof is relegated to Appendix A:
Lemma 3. Let B ∈ RN×N be the Laplacian of a connected
graph G with strictly positive edge weights. For any set of node
indices I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}, denote by BII the submatrix of B
formed by its rows I and columns I. Then ∀I, |I| ≤ N − 1,
BII is of full rank.
Note that Lemma 3 holds deterministically without as-
suming generic edge weights of the graph. For the case of
A = M, we let I = Ac = Mc, and Lemma 3 proves that
rank (BAcMc) = |Mc|. This implies the intuitive fact that
there exists no attack restricted to A that is unobservable by
a set of PMUs M = A.
Now, we address the general case of arbitrary A and
M. We have the following theorem demonstrating that hav-
ing sprank(BAcMc) = |Mc| almost surely guarantees
rank(BAcMc) = |Mc|. The proof is relegated to Appendix
B.
Theorem 1. For a connected weighted graph G = {N ,L,w},
assume that the edge weights are independent continuous
random variables strictly bounded away from zero from below,
and denote the Laplacian of G by B ∈ RN×N . Then, any
N ′×N ′′ submatrix of B, with min(N ′, N ′′) ≤ N − 1, has a
rank of min(N ′, N ′′) with probability one if it has a structural
rank of min(N ′, N ′′).
From Theorem 1, with |Ac| ≥ |Mc|, if sprank(BAcMc) =
|Mc| ≤ N − 1, we have with probability one that
rank(BAcMc) = |Mc|, and there exists no attack restricted
to A that is unobservable by a set of PMUs M.
Remark 1. It has been known in the literature that (see
e.g., [25]), a full structural rank of a matrix leads to a full
rank matrix with probability one, as long as the nonzero
entries in the matrix are drawn independently from continuous
probability distributions. However, it is worth noting that this
is not sufficient for proving Theorem 1. This is because, as in
Theorem 1, we are interested in matrices that are submatrices
of a graph Laplacian: even with the edge weights of the graph
drawn independently, the entries in these submatrices are
correlated due to the special structure of a graph Laplacian.
Such correlation leads to technical difficulties for the proof,
which can be overcome as shown in Appendix B.
We note that the structural rank of a matrix can be computed
in polynomial time by finding the maximum bipartite matching
in a graph [25]. Since whether an entry of B is non-zero is
solely determined by the topology of the network, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given A and M, whether a non-zero unob-
servable attack exists can be determined with probability one
based solely on the knowledge of the grid topology.
IV. SOLVING THE SPARSEST UNOBSERVABLE ATTACKS
In this section, we study the problem of finding the sparsest
unobservable attacks given any set of PMUs M (cf. (5)). As
remarked in Section II-C, l0 minimization such as (5) is NP-
hard. We will show that the sparsest unobservable attack can
in fact be found in polynomial time with probability one. We
first introduce a key concept — a vulnerable vertex cut. We
then state our main theorem that yields an explicit solution for
the sparsest unobservable attack problem (5). We prove that
this solution both upper and lower bounds the optimum of (5),
hence proving the theorem.
A. Vulnerable vertex cut and vulnerable vertex connectivity
We start with the following basic definitions:
Definition 5 (Vertex cut). A vertex cut of a connected graph
G is a set of vertices whose removal renders G disconnected.
Definition 6 (Vertex connectivity). The vertex connectivity of
a graph G, denoted by κ(G), is the size of the minimum vertex
cut of G, i.e., it is the minimum number of vertices that need
to be removed to make the remaining graph disconnected.
From the definition of the augmented graph GM in Section
II-D, since all the buses in M¯ (containingM and the dummy
bus) are pair-wise connected, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For any vertex cut of the augmented graph GM,
there is no pair of the buses in M¯ that are disconnected by
this cut.
Accordingly, we introduce the following notations which
will be used later on:
Notation 1. Given a vertex cut of GM, we denote the set of
buses disconnected from M¯ after removing the cut set by S.
The cut set itself is denoted by N(S).
With the vertex cut N(S), GM is partitioned into three
subgraphs:
1) S, which does not contain any bus in M¯, i.e., S ⊆ M¯c.
2) N(S), which is the vertex cut set itself, and may contain
buses in M¯.
3) N\N [S], which contains (not necessarily exclusively)
all the remaining buses in M¯ after removing the cut
set.
An illustrative example with a cut N(S) of size 2 is depicted
in Figure 2(b) in Section IV-C. We note that there is a slight
abuse of notation in N(S): In general, a cut set does not
necessarily consist of exactly all the neighboring nodes of S.
Nonetheless, as will be shown in the remainder of the paper,
we need only care about the minimum cut set, which indeed
consists of exactly all the neighboring nodes of S, namely,
N(S). Leveraging the above notation, we now introduce a
key type of vertex cut on GM.
Definition 7 (Vulnerable vertex cut). A vulnerable vertex cut
of a connected augmented graph GM is a vertex cut N(S)
for which |Uc ∩N [S]| ≥ |N(S)|+ 1.
In other words, the number of alterable buses in N [S] is
no less than the cut size plus one. The reason for calling
6such a vertex cut “vulnerable” will be made exact later in
Section IV-C. The basic intuition is the following. In order
to have ∆θM = 0 (unobservability), the key is to have the
phase angle changes on the cut N(S) be zero, with power
injection changes (which can only happen on the alterable
buses) restricted in N [S]. As will be shown later, this can be
achieved if a cut N(S) is “vulnerable” as defined above. We
note that it is possible that no vulnerable vertex cut exists (e.g.,
in the extreme case that all buses are unalterable).
Accordingly, we define the following variation on the vertex
connectivity.
Definition 8 (Vulnerable vertex connectivity). The vulnerable
vertex connectivity of an augmented graph GM, denoted by
κ¯(GM), is the size of the minimum vulnerable vertex cut of
GM. If no vulnerable vertex cut exists, κ¯(GM) is defined to
be ∞.
We note that the concepts of vulnerable vertex cut and
vulnerable vertex connectivity do not apply to the original
graph G. We immediately have the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If a vulnerable vertex cut exists, then κ¯(GM) ≤
M = |M|.
Proof: Suppose a vulnerable vertex cut exists, and
κ¯(GM) ≥ M + 1. Denote the minimum vulnerable vertex
cut by N(S) (cf. Notation 1). Now consider the set M: it is
a vertex cut of GM that separates the dummy bus and M¯c.
Because there are at least κ¯(GM)+1 ≥M+2 alterable buses
in N [S] ⊆ N [M¯ c], M is also a vulnerable vertex cut. This
contradicts the minimum vulnerable vertex cut having size at
least M + 1.
B. Main result
We now state the following theorem that gives an explicit
solution of the sparsest unobservable attack problem in terms
of the vulnerable vertex connectivity κ¯(GM).
Theorem 2. For a connected grid G = {N ,L,w}, assume
that the line reactances xl (l ∈ L) are independent continuous
random variables strictly bounded away from zero from below.
Given any M and U , the minimum sparsity of unobservable
attacks, i.e., the global optimum of (5), equals κ¯(GM) + 1
with probability one.
We note that finding the minimum vulnerable vertex connec-
tivity of a graph is computationally efficient. For polynomial
time algorithms we refer the readers to [27] and [28]. In
particular, vertex cuts are enumerated [28] starting from the
minimum and with increasing sizes, until a minimum vulnera-
ble vertex cut is identified. We now prove Theorem 2 by upper
and lower bounding the minimum sparsity of unobservable
attacks in the following two subsections.
C. Upper bounding the minimum sparsity of unobservable
attacks
We show that any vulnerable vertex cut N(S) provides an
upper bound on the optimum of (5) as follows.
Theorem 3. For a connected grid G and a set of PMUs M,
for any vulnerable vertex cut of GM denoted by N(S) (cf.
Notation 1), there exists an unobservable attack of sparsity no
higher than |N(S)|+ 1.
Proof: A vulnerable vertex cut N(S) partitions GM into
S, N(S) and N\N [S], with S ⊆Mc. Similarly to the range
space interpretation of the sparsest unobservable attack (5), it
is sufficient to show that there exists a non-zero vector in the
range space of BNS such that i) it has a sparsity no higher
than |N(S)|+ 1, and ii) non-zero power injections occur only
at the alterable buses.
By re-indexing the buses, WLOG, i) let S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|},
and ii) let BNS have the following partition as depicted in
Figure 2(a):
1) The top submatrix BSS is an |S| × |S| matrix.
2) The middle submatrix (which will be shown to be
BN(S)S ) consists of all the remaining rows, each of
which has at least one non-zero entry.
3) The bottom submatrix is an all-zero matrix.
In particular, from the definition of the Laplacian, the middle
submatrix of BNS , as described above, is exactly BN(S)S
because its row indices correspond to those buses not in S but
connected to at least one bus in S.
From the definition of the vulnerable vertex cut, |Uc ∩
N [S]| ≥ |N(S)|+1. Now, pick any set of |N(S)|+1 alterable
buses in Uc ∩ N [S], denote this set by A, and denote the
other buses in N [S] by U˜ , N [S]\A. Clearly, |U˜ | = |S| − 1.
Therefore, BU˜S (which is a submatrix of BN [S]S ) has |S|
columns but only |S| − 1 rows, and is hence column rank
deficient.
Now, we let ∆θS be a non-zero vector in the null space of
BU˜S :
BU˜S∆θS = 0. (9)
Then, we construct an attack vector ∆P = BNS∆θS : it has
some possibly non-zero values at the indices that correspond
to A, and has zero values at all other indices. Thus,
‖∆P ‖0 ≤ |A| = |N(S)|+ 1. (10)
Theorem 3 explains our terminology of a “vulnerable vertex
cut”, since if a vertex cut is vulnerable, it leads to an unobserv-
able attack. If a vulnerable vertex cut of GM exists, applying
Theorem 3 to the minimum one, we have that the optimum of
(5) is upper bounded by κ¯(GM) + 1. If no vulnerable vertex
cut exists, κ¯(GM) + 1 =∞ is a trivial upper bound.
We now provide a graph-theoretic interpretation of Theorem
3. As shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b), all the buses can be parti-
tioned into three subsets S, N(S) and N\N [S], corresponding
to the row indices of the top, middle and bottom submatrices
of BNS , respectively. N(S) is a vulnerable vertex cut of GM
that separates S from N\N [S]. The sparse attack ∆P (cf.
(10)) is formed by injecting/extracting power at |N(S)| + 1
alterable buses in N [S], such that the phase angle changes at
N\S are all zero. Note that (N\S) ⊇M. The example with
|N(S)| = 2 in Figure 2(b) illustrates a 3-sparse attack with
power injection/extractions at (assumed alterable) buses 1, 3
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(b) A 3-sparse unobservable power injection attack.
Fig. 2. Sparse attacks with voltage phase angle changes restricted to buses
1, 2, . . . |S|.
and |S|+ 1, such that the phase angle changes at N\S are all
zero.
We end this subsection by introducing a notion of “potential
impact” of unobservable attacks. We make the following
observation: As long as an attacker takes control of all the
power injections in a vulnerable vertex cut N(S) (assuming
they are alterable), it can always cancel out the effects of
anything that happens within N [S] on the measurements taken
in M (⊆ N\S). Thus, by taking control of all the buses
in N(S), an attacker can successfully hide from the system
operator a power injection attack with a zero norm as large as
|N [S]| = |N(S)|+ |S| ( |N(S)|+ 1). (11)
Accordingly, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 9. The potential impact of unobservable attacks
associated with a vulnerable vertex cut N(S) is defined as
|N [S]|.
Remark 2. Definition 9 is one characterization of attack
impact based solely on graph theoretic properties. In practice,
there are many different notions of attack impact depending
on, e.g., the interpretation of the attacks and the operating
objective of the system.
Employing Definition 9, we can differentiate the potential
impacts of multiple sparsest unobservable attacks with the
same sparsity. An illustration is depicted in Figure 3. In
M
……
… …
……
……
…
…
V1A
V1B
V2A
V2B
V2c
1[ ]N S
2[ ]N S
1( )N S
2( )N S
Fig. 3. An illustration of two vulnerable vertex cuts with the same size but
different potential impacts.
this example, two vulnerable vertex cuts both of size two,
N(S1) = {V1A, V1B} and N(S2) = {V2A, V2B}, are en-
closed by solid ovals. Accordingly, both cuts enable 3-sparse
unobservable attacks. However, their potential impacts are
significantly different. Cut N(S2) only disconnects one other
bus, namely S2 = {V2C} from the set of PMUs M, and
hence its potential impact equals |N [S2]| = 3. In comparison,
cut N(S1) disconnects all the vertices above N(S1) fromM,
and hence its potential impact equals |N [S1]|  3. With this
definition of potential impact, it is then natural for an attacker
to seek the sparsest unobservable attack with the greatest
potential impact.
As an immediate byproduct of the analysis of potential
impact, by letting S =Mc, we obtain the maximum potential
impact of all unobservable attacks in a power network:
Corollary 2. For a connected power grid G = {N ,L,w},
given any M denoting the PMU locations, the maximum
potential impact among all the unobservable attacks equals
|N [Mc]|.
D. Lower bounding the sparsity of unobservable attacks
We first define the following property of a matrix H ∈
RN×N , which will be shown to be equivalent to having
sprank(H) = N .
Property 1 (An equivalent condition for having a full struc-
tural rank).
∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N, and for any n×N submatrix of H,
the submatrix has at least n columns each with at least
one non-zero entry.
We have the following lemma whose proof is relegated to
Appendix C:
Lemma 6. Property 1 is equivalent to having sprank(H) =
N .
8We now prove the lower bounding part of Theorem 2,
namely, with probability one, all unobservable power injection
attacks ∆P must have ‖∆P ‖0 ≥ κ¯(GM)+1. The key idea is
in showing that the equivalence between Property 1 and a full
structural rank (cf. Lemma 6) implies a connection between
the vulnerable vertex connectivity and the feasibility condition
of unobservable attacks (cf. Lemma 2).
Proof of ‖∆P ‖0 ≥ κ¯(GM) + 1 for unobservable ∆P ,
w.p.1: We focus on GM and consider its corresponding
Laplacian B. Suppose there exists a power injection attack
∆P 6= 0 such that
∆θM = 0 and ‖∆P ‖0 ≤ κ¯(GM). (12)
Denote the buses with non-zero power injection changes
by A ⊆ Uc, and hence ∆PAc = 0. From (12), |A| ≤
κ¯(GM),∆θMc 6= 0, and 0 = ∆PAc =BAcMc∆θMc , imply-
ing that BAcMc is column rank deficient. We first consider
the case that a vulnerable vertex cut exists, i.e., κ¯(GM) <∞.
The proof for the case of κ¯(GM) =∞ follows similarly. For
notational simplicity, we will use κ¯ instead of κ¯(GM) in the
remainder of the proof.
a) If a vulnerable vertex cut exists, i.e., κ¯ <∞:
We will prove that, for all A ⊆ Uc with |A| ≤ κ¯, BAcMc
is of full column rank with probability one, i.e., (12) can only
happen with probability zero. From Lemma 5, κ¯ ≤ M . It is
then sufficient to prove for the “worst cases” with |A| = κ¯ =
M , i.e., |Ac| = |Mc| = N−κ¯ and BAcMc is a square matrix.
From Theorem 1 and Lemma 6, it is sufficient to show that
BAcMc satisfies Property 1, and hence is of full rank with
probability one. Recall from the definition of the Laplacian
B that, for any column (or row) of B, bi, (i = 1, . . . , N),
its non-zero entries correspond to bus i and those buses that
are connected to bus i. With this, we now prove that BAcMc
satisfies Property 1.
Consider any set of n (≤ N − κ¯) buses in Ac, denoted by
N˜ .
i) If N˜ ⊆ Mc: Based on the definition of the Laplacian
B, the n columns of BN˜Mc that correspond to the buses N˜
themselves each has at least one non-zero entry.
ii) If N˜ ∩ M 6= ∅: We prove that N(N˜ ) must contain at
least κ¯ buses. This is because, otherwise, |N(N˜ )| ≤ κ¯ − 1,
contradicting that κ¯ is the minimum size of vulnerable vertex
cuts for the following reasons:
1) A ⊆ N˜ c, and thus N˜ c has at least |A| = κ¯ alterable
buses.
2) |N(N˜ )| ≤ κ¯− 1 implies that N˜ c\N(N˜ ) 6= ∅, and thus
N(N˜ ) is a vertex cut that separates N˜ and N˜ c\N(N˜ ).
3) Because N˜ ∩M 6= ∅ and M are pairwise connected in
GM,M⊆ N [N˜ ]. Thus, N˜ c\N(N˜ ) andM are disjoint.
From 1), 3), and the fact that |N(N˜ )| ≤ κ¯−1, we observe that
N(N˜ ) is a vulnerable vertex cut of size κ¯− 1, contradicting
κ¯ being the vulnerable vertex connectivity.
Now, based on the definition of the Laplacian B, the n ×
N submatrix BN˜N must have at least n + κ¯ columns each
of which has at least one non-zero entry for the following
reasons:
• The n columns of BN˜N that correspond to the buses N˜
themselves each has at least one non-zero entry.
• As N˜ are connected to at least κ¯ other buses, each one
of these κ¯ neighbors of N˜ corresponds to one column of
BN˜N that has at least one non-zero entry.
Accordingly, the n × (N − κ¯) submatrix BN˜Mc has at least
n columns each of which has at least one non-zero entry.
Summarizing i) and ii), BAcMc satisfies Property 1, and is
thus of full column rank with probability one. Therefore, (12)
can only happen with probability zero.
b) If no vulnerable vertex cut exists, i.e., κ¯ =∞: IfM =
N , i.e., all buses have PMUs, then clearly no unobservable
attack exists. We now focus on M ≤ N − 1. Suppose |A| ≥
M + 1. Consider the set M¯ containing M and the dummy
bus. ∆θM = 0 (cf. (12)) implies that A ⊆ N [M¯c], and
thus N [M¯c] has at least |A| ≥ M + 1 alterable buses. Since
M (= N(M¯c)) separates the dummy node and N\M,M is
a vulnerable vertex cut. This contradicts the nonexistence of
a vulnerable vertex cut. Therefore, |A| ≤M . In this case, the
same proof as in the above case i) when a vulnerable vertex
cut exists applies, and (12) can only happen with probability
zero.
With the proofs of upper and lower bounds, we have now
proved Theorem 2. In addition, from the proof of Theorem 3,
we have a constructive solution of the sparsest unobservable
attack in polynomial time. We conclude this section by noting
the following fact similar to that in Section III: the minimum
sparsity of unobservable attacks is fully determined with
probability one by the network topology, the locations of the
alterable buses, and the locations of the PMUs.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the sparsest unobservable attacks
and their potential impacts when the system operator deploys
PMUs at optimized locations. We first provide an efficient
algorithm for optimizing PMU placement by the system opera-
tor. Next, we provide comprehensive evaluation of our analysis
and algorithms in multiple IEEE power system test cases as
well as large-scale Polish power systems. Our MATLAB codes
are openly available for download4.
A. Optimization of PMU placement for attack detection
We have seen in Section IV that the minimum sparsity and
potential impacts of unobservable attacks are determined fully
by the network topology, the locations of the alterable buses,
and the PMU placement. Note that, unlike network states and
parameters which can vary over short and medium time scales,
the transmission network topology and the alterable buses
typically stay the same over relatively long time scales. This
motivates the system operator to optimize the PMU placement
according to this information.
For the best performance in countering power injection
attacks, the system operator wants to raise the minimum
sparsity of unobservable attacks, as well as mitigate the
maximum potential impact of unobservable attacks. Algorithm
4The codes can be found at http://www.princeton.edu/∼yuez/pubs.html
9TABLE I
ALGORITHM 1
Greedy algorithm for PMU placement for countering power injection attacks
Place the 1st PMU at bus 1.
Repeat
If no unobservable attack exists given the current set of PMUs M, stop.
Step 1: Find all the minimum vulnerable vertex cuts of GN [M];
among them, find the cut with the greatest potential impact,
denoted by C(GN [M]).
Step 2: Among all the buses disconnected from N [M] by C(GN [M])
as well as those in the cut set C(GN [M]), place the next PMU
at the one such that the resulting maximum potential impact
among all the remaining unobservable attacks is minimized.
1 (cf. Table I) is developed for the system operator to greedily
place PMUs to pursue both objectives. In this algorithm, we
have assumed that the second PMU model in Section II-B is
employed, and the algorithm can be adapted to the first PMU
model by replacing N [M] with M.
Algorithm 1 is essentially a successive cut/attack elimi-
nation procedure. The purpose of Step 1 is to identify the
sparsest unobservable attack with the greatest potential impact.
Specifically, Step 1 can be performed as follows:
1) Assign arbitrarily one of the buses in M as the source
node;
2) For each of the buses in N\N [M], assign it as the des-
tination node, and compute all the minimum vulnerable
vertex cuts that separate such a source-destination pair.
3) Among all the computed source-destination vertex cuts
that have the same minimum size, compute their cor-
responding potential impacts, and select the minimum
vertex cut with the greatest potential impact, denoted by
C(GN [M]).
We note that all the minimum vulnerable vertex cuts can be
enumerated in polynomial time (c.f. [28]). In our numerical
evaluation using MATLAB on a laptop with Intel Core i7 3.1-
GHz CPU and 8 GB of RAM, it takes less than 0.2 seconds on
average for every PMU placed for the IEEE 300 bus systems.
This per-PMU time increases to about 50 seconds for the
Polish 3012 bus system. In Step 2, our primary goal is to
ensure that the cut set C(GN [M]) found in Step 1 does not
remain a legitimate vertex cut after placing the next PMU. This
can be achieved by placing the next PMU among the buses
disconnected from N [M] by C(GN [M]) as well as those in
C(GN [M]). Among such candidate buses, we choose the one
that renders the minimum maximum potential impact among
all the remaining unobservable attacks (cf. Corollary 2) had
the next PMU been placed at it.
B. Numerical evaluation of unobservable attacks vs. number
of PMUs
We evaluate our results in the IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 57-
bus, IEEE 118-bus, IEEE 300-bus, Polish 2383-bus, Polish
2737-bus, and Polish 3012-bus systems. The evaluation is
performed based on the software toolbox MATPOWER [29].
In each of these systems, we apply Algorithm 1 to generate
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a set of PMU locations greedily, with the number of PMUs
M increasing from one until all attacks become observable.
Moreover, from Algorithm 1, for all M , the minimum sparsity
of unobservable attacks as well as the maximum potential
impact among the sparsest unobservable attacks are found (cf.
Step 1 in Algorithm 1). We assume that all buses are alterable
in the test cases.
In general, for a given set of PMUs, one can also search
for the maximum potential impact among all s-sparse un-
observable attacks for any given sparsity s, (as opposed to
evaluate that among the sparsest attacks only as in Algorithm
1). However, this problem is NP-hard in s. In light of this, we
selectively focused on some level of sparsity of unobservable
attacks that is not minimally sparse, and evaluated their
maximum potential impacts.
Specifically, the minimum sparsity of unobservable attacks
and the maximum potential impact among these sparsest
attacks both as functions of the number of PMUs M are
plotted for the IEEE 30 and 118-bus power systems and the
Polish 3012-bus system, in Figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively. In
addition,
• For the IEEE 30-bus system, the maximum potential
impact among all 2-sparse, 3-sparse, 4-sparse and 5-
sparse unobservable attacks for the entire range of M are
plotted. (Note that the minimum sparsity of unobservable
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attacks does not exceed 3 for all M ).
• For the IEEE 118-bus system, the maximum potential
impact among all 3-sparse attacks when M ≥ 7 is
plotted. (Note that for M = 7 the minimum sparsity of
unobservable attacks is 2).
We make the following observations which appear in all
seven of the evaluated systems:
• In all seven systems, all the attacks become observable
with less than a third of the buses installed with PMUs
(assuming the second PMU model). The average percent-
age of the number of PMUs needed to have full network
observability equals 31.1%. While this number resembles
a well-known estimate of such percentage to be one third
[30], it also demonstrates the efficacy of Algorithm 1 in
PMU placement.
• The topologies of the tested power systems tend to
allow sparse power injection attacks. In other words,
the vertex connectivity of these power networks is often
small. Furthermore, there are often many unobservable
attacks with the same minimum sparsity: this is why even
after adding a lot more PMUs into the network, with
each addition eliminating the previous sparsest attack,
the minimum sparsity of an unobservable attack can still
remain the same.
• While there are many unobservable attacks with the
same sparsity, the potential impacts among them can
vary significantly. Moreover, as more PMUs are added,
the maximum potential impact among all the sparsest
unobservable attacks drops quickly until it reaches the
minimum sparsity. Similar behavior is demonstrated for
all the s-sparse unobservable attacks (s = 2, 3, 4, 5) for
the IEEE 30-bus system as shown in Figure 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied physical attacks that alter power generation
and loads in power networks while remaining unobservable
under the surveillance of system operators using PMUs. Given
a set of PMUs, we have first shown that the existence of
an unobservable attack that is restricted to any given subset
of the buses can be determined with probability one by
computing the structural rank of a submatrix of the network
Laplacian B. Next, we have provided an explicit solution to
the open problem of finding the sparsest unobservable attacks:
the minimum sparsity among all unobservable attacks equals
κ(GM) + 1 with probability one. The constructive solution
allows us to find all the sparsest unobservable attacks in
polynomial time. As a result, κ(GM) + 1 is a fundamental
limit of this minimum sparsity that is not only explicitly
attainable, but also unbeatable by all possible unobservable
attacks. We have then introduced a notion of potential impacts
of unobservable attacks. For the system operator to raise
the minimum sparsity while simultaneously mitigating the
maximum potential impact of all unobservable attacks, we
have devised an efficient algorithm of greedily placing the
PMUs. With optimized PMU deployment, we have evaluated
the sparsest unobservable attacks and their potential impacts
in the IEEE 30, 57, 118, 300-bus systems and the Polish 2383,
2737, 3012-bus systems. Finally, while this work has studied a
static system model and power injection attacks, extension to
dynamic systems, measurements and power injection attacks
remains an interesting future direction, for which we expect
that similar insights will apply.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof of Lemma 3: First, we denote the Laplacian of the induced
subgraph G[I] by LI . Denote the number of connected components
of the induced subgraph G[I] by c. By properly re-indexing the nodes,
we have
BII = LI +DI , (13)
where LI is a block-diagonal matrix whose each block LjI (1 ≤
j ≤ c) is positive semidefinite and corresponds to one connected
component of G[I],
LI =
L
1
I
L2I
· · ·
LcI
 , (14)
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and DI is diagonal, which we write in a block diagonal form whose
each block DjI (1 ≤ j ≤ c) is itself a diagonal matrix with non-
negative entries,
DI =
D
1
I
D2I
· · ·
DcI
 . (15)
Since the original graph G is connected, each connected component
of the induced subgraph G[I] must be connected to at least one node
in N\I. This implies the following fact:
Fact 1. Each diagonal submatrix DjI (1 ≤ j ≤ c) has at least one
strictly positive diagonal entry.
Now, for any non-zero vector xI ∈ RI , we write it as a
concatenation of c sub-vectors:
xI = [[x
1
I ]
T [x2I ]
T . . . [xcI ]
T ]T , (16)
where the length of each sub-vector xjI (1 ≤ j ≤ c) follows the size
of the sub-matrix LjI .
As LI is positive semidefinite, xTILIxI ≥ 0:
1) If xTILIxI > 0, then immediately x
T
IBIIxI > 0.
2) If xTILIxI = 0, then LIxI = 0, which implies
LjIx
j
I = 0, ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , c. (17)
Namely, xjI is in the null space of L
j
I . Note that as L
j
I
corresponds to a single connected component of G[I], the
dimension of the null space of LjI is one, and is spanned by the
all one vector 1 = [1, 1, . . . , 1]T with the appropriate length.
Thus, xjI must be in the form of αj ·1, for some αj > 0. From
Fact 1, DjI has non-negative diagonal entries with at least one
of them strictly positive, and we have [xjI ]
TDjIx
j
I > 0, and
hence xTI (BII)xI = x
T
I (LI +DI)xI > 0.
Therefore, BII is positive definite, and hence of full rank.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, for a matrix H ∈ RN1×N2 with a full structural rank, we
define an equivalent term, “a non-zero permuted diagonal”, for a set
of min(N1, N2) independent entries (cf. Definition 3). This term is
based on the following intuition: For example, for H ∈ RN×N , a
non-zero permuted diagonal (i.e., a set of N independent entries)
corresponds to a permutation function pi(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , such
that Hi,pi(i) 6= 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Proof of Theorem 1: It is sufficient to prove for the case of
N ′ = N ′′ ≤ N − 1. We use induction as follows.
i) Clearly, any non-zero 1× 1 submatrix of B is of full rank.
ii) Assume that all t × t (t ≤ N − 2) submatrices of B with a
non-zero permuted diagonal are of full rank with probability one.
For a (t+1)× (t+1) submatrix of B with a non-zero permuted
diagonal, we denote it by B′. We denote the set of row indices of
B that are selected in forming B′ by R = {r(1), r(2), . . . , r(t +
1)}, and similarly the set of selected column indices by C =
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(t + 1)}: B′i,j = Br(i),c(j), ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ t + 1.
Clearly, if R = C, B′ is of full rank from Lemma 3.
Now, consider the case that R = I ∪ J , C = I ∪ K, where
I ∩ J = I ∩ K = ∅, J ∩ K = ∅, J ,K 6= ∅. In other words, I
denotes the common indices that appear in both the row indices R
and the column indices C, J denotes the indices that appear in R
but not in C, and K denotes the indices that appear in C but not in
R. WLOG, B′ has the form as in Figure 7(a), in which the common
row and column indices I are located in the upper left part of B′,
and B′ consists of four blocks BII ,BJI ,BIK,BJK.
Since B′ has a non-zero permuted diagonal, there exists a per-
mutation function pi(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1, such that B′i,pi(i) >
0, ∀i = 1, . . . , t+1. In other words, the mapping r(i)→ c(pi(i)), i =
B
BB
B
(a) Partition of the matrix B′.
'
1, 1t t B
'
[1: ], [1: ]t tB
'
1, [1: ]t tB
'
[1: ], 1t tB
(b) Case 1, B′t+1,t+1 ∈ BJK is on a non-zero permuted diagonal
of B′.
Fig. 7. Proof of Theorem 1.
1, 2, . . . , t + 1 forms a bijection between I ∪ J and I ∪ K, such
that Br(i),c(pi(i)) > 0, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1. We now consider the
following two cases:
Case 1: ∃r(i) ∈ J , s.t. c(pi(i)) ∈ K. In other words, one of the
entries in BJK is on a non-zero permuted diagonal of B′.
WLOG, assume that the entry B′t+1,t+1 in BJK is on a non-zero
permuted diagonal of B′, i.e., pi(t+ 1) = t+ 1. As in Figure 7(b),
we partition B′ into B′[1:t],[1:t],B
′
t+1,[1:t],B
′
[1:t],t+1 and B
′
t+1,t+1.
Because B′t+1,t+1 is on a non-zero permuted diagonal of B′, the
t× t submatrix B′[1:t],[1:t] has a non-zero permuted diagonal.
From the induction assumption, B′[1:t],[1:t] is of full rank with
probability one. When B′[1:t],[1:t] is of full rank, let
α = B′−1[1:t],[1:t]B
′
[1:t],t+1. (18)
Thus, B′[1:t],t+1 = B
′
[1:t],[1:t]α. Then, B
′ is rank-deficient if and
only if
B′t+1,t+1 = B
′
t+1,[1:t]α (19)
Note that, except for Br(t+1),c(t+1) = B′t+1,t+1 itself, there are
only three other entries in the Laplacian B that are correlated with
B′t+1,t+1:
Bc(t+1),r(t+1) = Br(t+1),c(t+1) = B
′
t+1,t+1, (20)
Br(t+1),r(t+1) = −
∑
j 6=r(t+1)
Br(t+1),j , (21)
Bc(t+1),c(t+1) = −
∑
i6=c(t+1)
Bi,c(t+1). (22)
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(a) Case 2, B′1,t+1 ∈ BIK is on a non-zero permuted
diagonal of B′.
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(b) Case 2, B′i,i depends on B
′
i,1,B
′
i,t+1 only
via the sum B′i,1 +B
′
i,t+1.
Fig. 8. Proof of Theorem 1.
However, as r(t + 1) ∈ J ⇒ r(t + 1) /∈ I ∪ K, c(t + 1) ∈ K ⇒
c(t+1) /∈ I ∪J , none of the above three entries is selected into the
submatrixB′. Therefore,B′t+1,t+1 is independent to all other entries
in B′, and is hence independent to B′t+1,[1:t]α. Because B
′
t+1,t+1
is drawn from a continuous distribution, the probability that (19) is
satisfied is zero. As a result, B′ is of full rank with probability one.
Case 2: ∀r(i) ∈ J , c(pi(i)) /∈ K. Thus, ∃r(i) ∈ I, s.t. c(pi(i)) ∈
K. In other words, one of the entries in BIK is on a non-zero
permuted diagonal of B′.
WLOG, assume that the entry B′1,t+1 in BIK is on a non-zero
permuted diagonal of B′, i.e., pi(1) = t + 1. As in Figure 8(a),
we partition B′ into B′1,[1:t],B
′
[2:t+1],[1:t],B
′
1,t+1 and B′[2:t+1],t+1.
Because B′1,t+1 is on a non-zero permuted diagonal of B′, the t× t
submatrix B′[2:t+1],[1:t] has a non-zero permuted diagonal.
From the induction assumption, B′[2:t+1],[1:t] is of full rank with
probability one. When B′[2:t+1],[1:t] is of full rank, let
α = B′−1[2:t+1],[1:t]B
′
[2:t+1],t+1. (23)
Thus, B′[2:t+1],t+1 = B
′
[2:t+1],[1:t]α. Then, B
′ is rank-deficient if
and only if
B′1,t+1 = B
′
1,[1:t]α (24)
Note that r(1) = c(1) ∈ I. We have
B′1,1 = Br(1),c(1) = Br(1),r(1) = −
∑
j 6=r(1)
Br(1),j
= −B′1,t+1 − C1, (25)
where B′1,t+1 = Br(1),c(t+1), and C1 =
∑
j 6=r(1),j 6=c(t+1)Br(1),j
is independent to B′1,t+1. Substitute (25) for B′1,1 in (24), we have
B′1,t+1 = α1B
′
1,1 +
t∑
j=2
αjB
′
1,j
= −α1B′1,t+1 +
(
−α1C1 +
t∑
j=2
αjB
′
1,j
)
.
⇔ (1 + α1)B′1,t+1 = −α1C1 +
t∑
j=2
αjB
′
1,j . (26)
Note that B′1,t+1 is independent to α1, and independent to the right
hand side of (26). Because B′1,t+1 is drawn from a continuous
distribution, if α1 6= −1, the probability (conditioned on α1 6= −1)
that (26) is satisfied is zero.
Next, we prove that the probability of α1 = −1 is zero. From
(23), if α1 = −1,
B′[2:t+1],t+1 =
t∑
j=1
αjB
′
[2:t+1],j
⇔ B′[2:t+1],1 +B′[2:t+1],t+1 =
t∑
j=2
αjB
′
[2:t+1],j . (27)
Thus, α1 = −1 implies that B′[2:t+1],1+B′[2:t+1],t+1 is in the range
space of B′[2:t+1],[2:t]. Note that, all the entries in the two vectors
B′[2:t+1],1 and B
′
[2:t+1],t+1 are mutually independent non-diagonal
entries of B.
Now, consider that we make the following change of distributions
of certain entries in B′ (and also B correspondingly):
1) ∀i = 2, . . . , t + 1, let B′i,1(= Br(i),c(1)) be drawn from the
distribution of the sum B′i,1 +B
′
i,t+1.
2) Let every entry of B′[2:t+1],t+1 to be a deterministic zero, i.e.,
∀i = 2, . . . , t+ 1, B′i,t+1(= Br(i),c(t+1)) = 0.
Observe that,
• As in Figure 8(b), ∀i, s.t. r(i) ∈ I, the only entry in
B′[2:t+1],[2:t] that is correlated with B
′
i,1 and B
′
i,t+1 is
B′i,i = −(B′i,1 +B′i,t+1)− C2, (28)
where C2 =
∑
j 6=c(1),j 6=c(t+1)Br(i),j . Note that B
′
i,i depends
on B′i,1,B
′
i,t+1 only via the sum B
′
i,1 +B
′
i,t+1.
• ∀i, s.t. r(i) ∈ J , B′i,1 and B′i,t+1 are independent to all the
entries in B′[2:t+1],[2:t].
This implies the following fact:
Fact 2. The joint distribution of B′[2:t+1],1 and B
′
[2:t+1],[2:t] after the
change of distributions is equal to the joint distribution ofB′[2:t+1],1+
B′[2:t+1],t+1 and B
′
[2:t+1],[2:t] before the change.
We now note that, after the change of distributions, the t×t matrix
B′[2:t+1],[1:t] = [B
′
[2:t+1],1 B
′
[2:t+1],[2:t]] still satisfies the induction
assumption, and is hence of full rank with probability one. Thus,
before the change of distributions, B′[2:t+1],1 + B
′
[2:t+1],t+1 falls
in the range space of B′[2:t+1],[2:t] with probability zero. Therefore,
α1 = −1 with probability zero, hence the probability that (24) is
satisfied is zero. As a result, B′ is of full rank with probability one.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We first prove the following lemma in preparation for proving
Lemma 6:
Lemma 7. For a matrix H ∈ RN×N , if the following conditions
are satisfied,
H1,1 6= 0, (29)
∀i = 2, . . . , N,Hi,i−1 6= 0, (30)
∀i = 2, . . . , N, the sub-column H[1,i],i has at least one
non-zero entry, (31)
then H satisfies Property 1.
A depiction of a matrix satisfying (29), (30) and (31) is given in
Figure 9, in which the entries with an “x” are known to be non-zero,
and the shaded sub-columns each has at least one non-zero entry.
x
x
x
x
x
x
… 
… 
[1,2],2H
[1, ],N NH
[1, 1], 1N N H[1, * 1], * 1r r H
 row r*
Fig. 9. A matrix that satisfies (29), (30) and (31) as in Lemma 7.
Proof: We use induction as follows.
i) The lemma is true for N = 1.
ii) Assume that the lemma is true for all N = 1, . . . , t. For N =
t+ 1:
First, because the upper left (N − 1) × (N − 1) submatrix of
H satisfies the induction assumption, each of H’s first left N − 1
columns must contain at least one non-zero entry. From (31), the
last column of H has at least one non-zero entry. Thus, the case of
n = N in Property 1 holds for H .
Next, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, for any n×N submatrix of H , denote it
by H ′, and its corresponding row indices in H by r(1) < r(2) <
. . . < r(n).
• If the last n rows of H are selected to form H ′, (i.e.
r(i) = i + N − n, i = 1, . . . , n), from (30), the columns
N − n, . . . , N − 1 each has one non-zero entry, namely,
HN−n+1,N−n, . . . ,HN,N−1.
• Otherwise, there exists a row r∗, r∗ ≥ N −n+1, which is not
selected inH ′ (cf. Figure 9). In this case, the row indices ofH ′
can be partitioned into two subsets: ∃i(∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}), r(1) <
. . . < r(i) ≤ r∗ − 1 and r∗ + 1 ≤ r(i + 1) < . . . ≤ r(n).
On the one hand, note that the upper left (r∗ − 1) × (r∗ −
1) submatrix of H satisfies the induction assumption. Thus,
among the first r∗−1 columns of the rows r(1), . . . , r(i), there
exists i columns each of which has one non-zero entry. On the
other hand, from (30), Hr(i+1),r(i+1)−1, . . . ,Hr(n),r(n)−1 are
all non-zero, and none of these non-zero entries appears in the
first r∗ − 1 columns. Therefore, there exist n columns of H ′
such that each of them has at least one non-zero entry.
We now prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6: Clearly, Property 1 is implied by the non-
zero diagonal property.
To prove that the non-zero diagonal property is also implied by
Property 1, we use induction on N as follows.
i) For N = 1, the non-zero diagonal property is implied by
Property 1.
ii) Assume that ∀N ≤ t, (t ≥ 1, ) the non-zero diagonal property
is implied by Property 1.
For N = t+ 1, we use another induction on the number of rows
n of submatrices of H in proving a non-zero permuted diagonal
property.
a) For n = 1, directly from Property 1, any n×N submatrix of
H (i.e., any row of H) has at least one non-zero entry.
b) Assume that ∀n ≤ t < N , ∀n ×N submatrix of H , denoted
by H ′, it has the following property:
∃pi(i) (i = 1, . . . , n) that satisfies pi(i) 6= pi(j), ∀i 6= j,
s.t. H ′i,pi(i) 6= 0. (32)
x
x
x
0 0… 
0 0… 
N columns 







n rows
… 
… 
xThe rth row 0 0… 
… … … 
… … … 
… 
… 
Fig. 10. The matrix H′ in the proof of Lemma 6.
For n = t+1, from the induction assumption b), there exists a non-
zero permutated diagonal for the (n−1)×N submatrix H ′[2:n],[1:N ]:
WLOG, assume that it corresponds to ∀i = 2, . . . , n,H ′i,i−1 6= 0 (cf.
Figure 10.)
Now, we use proof by contradiction, and assume that H ′ does not
have a non-zero permuted diagonal. Then, the sub-rowH ′1,[n,N ] must
be all zero, because otherwise any non-zero entry within H ′1,[n,N ]
will form a non-zero permuted diagonal of H ′ with H ′i,i−1(i =
2, . . . , n). From Property 1, the 1st row of H ′ must have at least
one non-zero entry. WLOG, assume that H ′1,1 is non-zero. Then, the
sub-row H ′2,[n,N ] must be all-zero, because otherwise any non-zero
entry within H ′2,[n,N ] will form a non-zero permuted diagonal of H
′
with H ′1,1 and H ′i,i−1(i = 3, . . . , n). From Property 1, the first two
rows of H ′ must have at least two columns each of which has at
least one non-zero entry. Since H ′2,1 6= 0, there is at least one more
column of H ′[1,2],[1,N ] that has at least one non-zero entry. WLOG,
assume that the sub-column H ′[1,2],2 has at least one non-zero entry,
(cf. the shaded area in Figure 10).
Similarly, consider the rth row of H ′. Note that the subma-
trix H ′[1:r−1],[1:r−1] satisfies (29), (30) and (31), and hence satis-
fies Property 1 by Lemma 7. From the induction assumption ii),
H ′[1:r−1],[1:r−1] has a non-zero permuted diagonal. Then, the sub-
row H ′r,[n,N ] must be all-zero, because otherwise any non-zero
entry within H ′r,[n,N ] will form a non-zero permuted diagonal of
H ′ with the non-zero permuted diagonal of H ′[1:r−1],[1:r−1] and
H ′i,i−1(i = r + 1, . . . , n).
Therefore, the submatrix H ′[1,N ],[n,N ] must be all-zero. This
implies that there are only n − 1 (instead of n) columns of H ′
each of which has at least one non-zero entry, and hence contradicts
with Property 1.
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